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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLEO R. POWELL,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

vs.

)

DICK E. BASTIAN, DEE V. SHARP,
dba SHARP REALTY, and Provo
Branch PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
g LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Federally
Chartered Savings and Loan
Association,

Case No. 13,939

)
)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents.
)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
DICK E. BASTIAN

NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff Cleo Powell claims that a sale by her of real
property to defendant Dick E. Bastian was in fact a mortgage;
she sued to recover what she claimed was unlawful interest
and sales expenses wrongfully charged to her, and for damages.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT
The trial court found the transaction to be a sale with
an option to repurchase and found against the plaintiff's contentions.

The trial court granted plaintiff judgment for title

costs which-had been tendered by Bastian in his pleadings and
for $228.33 taxes.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Dick E. Bastian seeks affirmance of the trial
court's judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent Bastian agrees with the facts of the case
as stated by the appellant.

The appellant in her statement

of the facts of the case at page 4 of her brief states that
the facts "are substantially the same as the facts found in
the trial court's findings of fact (R 101), . . . "
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN THE ABSENCE OF A STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OR OF
A STATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE AS PROVIDED IN
RULE 75(m), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PRESUMED TO BE SUPPORTED
BY EVIDENCE
Plaintiff elected to perfect her appeal without furnishing
the court a transcript of the evidence in the trial court.
was a substitute for a transcript provided.

Neither

Under earlier statutes,

such an appeal would be an appeal on the judgment roll.
Under the former practice where bills of exception were
perfected, the uniform rule was that in the absence of a bill
of exceptions, the parties were bound by the findings of fact
made by the trial court.

Such was the holding of the following

Utah cases: McGuire v. State Bank of Tremonton, et. al. , 164
P. 494; Byron, et. al. v. Utah Copper Company, 178 P. 53; Jensen
v. Jensen, et. al., 269 P. 485; Sidney Stevens Implement Company
v^ Ogden City, 33 P. 2d 181 and Keller v^ Chournous, 77 P. 2d
626.
The findings of the court in this case are that the transaction
between Powell and Bastian was one of a sale of the Powell property
by Powell to Bastian with the reservation of an option to
-2-

repurchase the property by Powell.

In the absence of any factual

material which can be examined by this court, it is difficult
to see how the trial court's findings can be disturbed.
POINT II
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES DETERMINES WHETHER A
CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY IS A SALE OR IS
INTENDED TO BE A MORTGAGE
The fullest treatment by the Utah Supreme Court of the
elements of disputes in cases where there is a question as to
whether a deed was intended as a fee simple conveyance or as
a mortgage is found in Kjar v. Brimley, 27 U. 2d 411, 497 P.
2d 23. At page 25 the court said:
V/hether a transaction in the form of a sale with an
option to repurchase is in fact a sale, or a loan disguised
as a sale to cover up a scheme to collect usurious interest
is an issue for the trier of fact. The controlling
question is what was the intention of the parties as
it existed at the time of the execution and delivery
of the instrument? A mortgage may exist, although the
mortgagee has no right to compel payment. The law may
imply a promise to repay a debt under particular circumstances
of any case, where it is clear that the lender had relied
on the property for his security, being satisfied that
he is protected by its high value in relation to the
amount loaned. If there be a large margin between the
debt or sum advanced and the value of the land conveyed,
this represents an assurance of payment stronger than
any promise or bond of a necessitous borrower or debtor.
The trier of fact determined that the transaction was In
fact a sale with an option to repurchase.

Finding of Fact number

10 reads as follows:
10. The court finds that the plaintiff Powell testified at all times that her arrangement with the defendant
Bastian -was one by terms of which she had an option
to repurchase the property for a three month period.
The court finds that there is no instance in the record
In which the transaction between the plaintiff Powell
and the defendant Bastian was characterized as anything
other than as a sale to Mr. Bastian with an option
on the part of Mrs. Powell to repurchase the property.
-3-

The appellant does not cite any evidence to contradict
that finding.

In fact, the appellant concedes that the facts

were as they were found by the court. Appellant has included
as part of the record the deposition of Mrs. Powell. Her deposition
was not introduced as evidence and is not properly before this
court.

If it is considered, it will substantiate the Findings

of Fact as made by the trial court.
On this record it is respectfully urged that the Supreme
Court has no choice but to affirm the trial courtTs finding
that the transaction was a sale with an option to repurchase
the property.
POINT III
THE OPTION TO REPURCHASE THE PROPERTY WAS IN FACT
EXERCISED AND MRS. POWELL WAS THE SELLER
The Findings of Fact recite that in August of 1970 Mrs.
Powell listed the property for sale with Boley Realty.

When

an offer was obtained from Martin L. Ethington and Lois E.
Ethington, Mrs. Powell signed the "Earnest Money Agreement
and Offer to Purchase.11

She then requested Mr. Bastian to

sign it too. The transaction with the Ethingtons was closed
by Prudential Savings and Loan Association.
The sale to the Ethingtons was made at the sole instance
and direction of Mrs. Powell.

She listed the property in order

to exercise her option to repurchase it.

She might have specified

that the money be paid from Ethingtons to her and then to Bastian.
She did not do so and she was paid in accordance with the terms
of the option agreement except for the matter of title insurance
and taxes in the amount of $22 8.33, which the court found that

Bastian should pay.
The option price to Mrs. Powell was $18,000.00 plus 8%
interest on $16,00.0.00 for the period of time that the option
remained unexercised.

If the option had remained unexercised

then Bastian would have retained ownership of the property.
If the transaction had in fact been a mortgage, then it
could be argued that there was an excess charge of interest.
It is pointless to talk about usury when the uncontroverted
facts say that the relationship was a sale with a retained
option.
It may be presumptious of Bastian not to reply briefly to
appellantfs argument with respect to the claim of usury.

For

that reason only, Bastianfs understanding of that law is set
forth even though, under his view, it is not relevant.
As nearly as this respondent can understand the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, the transaction between Bastian and Powell
was a "consumer related loan."

Bastian concludes that by virtue

of Title 703-3-602, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Title 70B-3^602
refers to Title 70B-3-201 as the statute fixing the maximum
interest allowable.

That rate is 18% per annum.

The Uniform Consumer Credit Code does not contain any
specific provision providing for the consequences of usury
in a consumer related loan.
The only statutory provision that appears to apply Is
Tirle 703-5-202(3).

That statute does not make the obligation

void but merely provides that a debtor has a right to a refund
if he has paid interest in excess of the amount allowed by
-5-

law or to a credit for an excess amount charged but not paid.
The annotatorfs note to Title 70B-5-202 indicates that
70B-5-202C2) is the statutory relief granted to a debtor who
borrows money at a rate in excess of 18% from a person not authorized to make such a loan.
The annotatorTs statement would seem to be too broad.
Title 70B~5-202(2) deals with creditors who have violated provisions
of the act applying to authority to make supervised loans.
A "supervised loan" is defined by Title 70B-3-50K3) .. That
section reads,
(3) 'Supervised loan1 means a regulated loan in
which the rate of the loan finance charge exceeds 18
per cent per year as determined according to the provisions on loan finance charge for consumer loans
(section 70B-3-201).
A regulated loan is one made by a "Regulated Lender" who is
a person engaged in the business of making regulated loans.
There is nothing in the record to show that Bastian is
a regulated lender so that statute would not apply if the transaction had been a loan, which it was not.
It appears to this respondent that the only statute which
could have application would be Title 70B-5-202(3) . If we were
concerned with a debtor-creditor relationship, which we are
not, then a common law right may exist to recover interest paid
in excess of allowed amounts as indicated by the annotation
in 59 ALR 2d 526.
CONCLUSION
Respondent Bastian respectfully represents that the
Findings of Fact made by the trial court were correct and are
-6-

binding upon this court in the absence of a record which can
be examined by this court.
Respectfully submitted,
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